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Abstract
This paper reviews the reasons that Human-in-the-Loop is both critical for pre-
venting widely-understood failure modes for machine learning, and not a practical
solution. Following this, we review two current heuristic methods for addressing this.
The first is provable safety envelopes, which are possible only when the dynamics
of the system are fully known, but can be useful safety guarantees when optimal
behavior is based on machine learning with poorly-understood safety characteris-
tics. The second is the simpler circuit breaker model, which can forestall or prevent
catastrophic outcomes by stopping the system, without any specific model of the
system. This paper proposes using heuristic, dynamic safety envelopes, which are
a plausible half–way point between these approaches that allows human oversight
without some of the more difficult problems faced by Human-in-the-Loop systems.
Finally, the paper concludes with how this approach can be used for governance of
systems when otherwise unsafe machine learning is deployed.
There are important shortcomings of fully autonomous systems that can be reme-
died by allowing a human to control certain parts of the system, known as Human-
in-the-Loop. As noted by Richard Danzig[1] among others, there are fundamental
dynamics that make this solution unworkable. One of the issues is that machine
learning technology runs on computers that are orders of magnitudes faster than
humans. Not only that, but they are often far less expensive, make better use of
large datasets, and can react in real time. These factors are not incidental to the use
of AI, but rather form a large part of the reason that (narrow) AI is used. For this
reasons, human interruption of AI decision making often obviates the very reason it
is being used.
As discussed by Paul et al.[8], for the purposes of autonomous systems, we can
consider three levels of automation: direct automation of systems that automat-
ically execute pre-defined actions, machine learning and narrow AI that can act
autonomously given a narrow and rigidly defined domain, and general AI that can
make decisions in a way that is context aware and reflects understanding of the
domain. While there are clear drawbacks to simple automation, and clear dangers
from mis-aligned or very capable general intelligence[13], the limitations of the sec-
ond of these three levels is the focus of the present discussion, and it will be referred
to using the somewhat ambiguous term “machine learning.”
Given that we are both ruling out automation as insufficient, and strong artificial
intelligence as, at the very least, beyond our current capabilities, the oft-repeated
suggestion of “Human-in-the-Loop” to prevent failures seem naive - if we wanted to
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slow the process down to human speed, and require humans to be involved, there
is little reason for AI rather than automation of pre-defined choices for the human
decision maker. If the interactions are too fast for true human control, on the other
hand, as Danzig colorfully put it, “Human decisionmakers are riders traveling across
obscured terrain with little or no ability to assess the powerful beasts that carry and
guide them.” This rules out what has been called the Licklider’s augmentation
approach[9] which was temporarily dominant in chess[4], for enabling cooperative
use of AI, at least when real-time interaction is needed. At the same time, failure
modes of machine learning, including vulnerability to adversarial examples, lack of
awareness of changing context, and others, necessitate a form of human involve-
ment1.
There are a few ways that we can square the conceptual circle of needing im-
possibly fast and accurate human oversight, which range from provably impossible,
to currently unreachable, to merely hard. The first is to build systems that are
not susceptible to the various ways in which agents in complex multi-party systems
can fail (as outlined by Manheim[6],) is provably impossible in at least some cases,
such as preventing adversarial examples, as proved by Shahafi et al.[10]. The sec-
ond, which currently resides squarely in the realm of science fiction, are what Robin
Hanson has christened “Ems,” or uploaded human intelligences that can be run on
a computational substrate[2]. These could conceivably be run fast enough to allow
the type of real-time collaboration that Licklider envisioned, but are well beyond our
current technological reach. The final three, however, are more realistic paradigms.
The first of these potential solutions is the “Provable Limited Scope” model.
This is exemplified by the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) model of Shalev-
Shwartz, Shammah, and Shashua[11]. In this model, the autonomous systems are
free to build whatever driving policy they wish, with the restriction that the car
stays within a safety envelope defined via specific restrictions on its position and
speed relative to other cars. For example, it muse stay far enough from the car
in front that it can stop without impacting even if that car stops at some defined
physically feasible maximum deceleration. In the case of RSS, it is possible to prove
that a system of agents abiding by these rules will not ever collide. If such a model
can be constructed for a given context, it is reasonable to give a machine learning
system free range with the knowledge that it will act safely.
A potentially simpler, but much less effective version of this is the second pos-
sibility, “Heuristic Limited Scope” which provides a far weaker guarantee. As a
simple example of this model, the “circuit breaker” for financial markets sets limits
on the maximum price movement of financial assets. By relying on a purely heuristic
barrier that does not relate to the dynamics of the system in question, this provides
much less assurance that the system is safe, as should be obvious from the existence
of specific ongoing failure modes used as examples of multi-agent failure modes, per
Manheim[6], such as algorithmic momentum ignition[12].
The final method relies on contextual awareness and limits provided dynamically.
This falls short of the provable guarantee of the first model, but can be far less limited
than the heuristic model. This “Dynamic Safety Envelope” would rely on automated
systems for detecting and understanding the current system, potentially combined
1It is sometimes argued that these flaws can be remedied with better systems. This is true, but
only when “better” refers to contextually aware, generally intelligent systems - that is, General Artificial
Intelligence.
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with human oversight, and providing parameters for safety. In this case, the envelope
does not need to be redefined in real-time as decisions are made, nor does it need
to be a fixed heuristic. Instead, changes can be specified at the potentially much
slower speed needed for humans to orient to broader systemic changes.
For example, consider a system for automated detection of and response to auto-
mated propaganda, such as automated banning of accounts. This could be a signifi-
cant liability if the automated system learns from live data, since a clever opponent
might craft messages from systems that would correctly be flagged as propaganda
bots, but which also are adversarial examples crafted to poison the classifier[5, 3],
in this case to cause it to ban accounts chosen by the attacker. In this case, change-
point detection algorithms can identify that there were changes in the distribution
of the bot behavior, and if detected, could stop itself to await review, or simply
exclude those data points from the training set until further review. (Other parts
of the safety envelope might include limits on which types of accounts to suspend
without human review, etc.)
By limiting the need for human intervention to where the system notes unusual
behavior, humans can decide whether the current issue needs further review, without
needing to stay involved at each decision point. That review can be done both more
leisurely, and via help from other algorithmic analyses. For example, the change in
bot behavior might be compared to shifts found in a broader set of data sources via
change point detection across multiples sources and streams, such as Mei’s work [7].
This might make it clear that the detected change is part of a broader shift, rather
than an attack.
If these sorts of contextual, human assisted automated systems can be trained
to provide approximations of a safe-envelope for decision making, they need not
be controlled by the same actor as the one controlling the agents. Regulation of
machine learning systems can be done by an industry consortium or a government
regulator. The human factors and joint decisions obviously lead to drawbacks and
limitations regarding what safety is desired, and the extent to which the safe envelope
of behavior is conservative or liberal in definition. Still, this approach seems like a
promising way forward in the short term for deployment of AI that is safer than
currently envisioned, even though it is not fully safe. This class of system does
not, to the knowledge of the author, currently exist, but seems to be a promising
method of allowing human oversight without needing real-time oversight. This could
lead to marginally safer systems even short of provable security, or even security
with high-probability. Despite being essentially a stop-gap measure, it seems like
a reasonable middle ground between restricting AI to provably safe domains, and
allowing arbitrary AI to be deployed with the untenable assumption that nothing
will go wrong.
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